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Abstract 
Simplifying business formalization and eliminating outdated formalities is often a good 
way of improving the institutional environment for firms. Unfortunately, the World Bank’s 
Doing Business project is harming such policies by promoting a reform agenda that gives 
them priority even in countries lacking functional business registers, so that the reformed 
registers keep producing valueless information, but faster. Its methodology also promotes 
biased measurements that impede proper consideration of the essential tradeoffs in the design 
of formalization institutions. If Doing Business is to stop jeopardizing its true objectives and 
contribute positively to scientific progress, institutional reform and economic development, 
then its aims, governance and methodology need to change.  
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1.  Introduction 
Science requires measurement and the World Bank’s Doing Business project (2003-2009; 
hereafter, DB) had the resources and held the promise for developing serious measurement, 
thus providing a better basis for institutional science. Xosé H. Vázquez and I saw the first DB 
report as a first step in the right direction, even though it contained numerous measurement 
errors and at best provided partial proxies of institutional characteristics (Arruñada and 
Vázquez, 2004). However, we already felt that its usefulness was limited because many of its 
initial assumptions prejudiced the results, mainly by measuring only ex ante and formally 
mandatory procedures (as explored more fully in Arruñada, 2007a). We concluded that a 
sustained effort was needed to improve its measurements and allow it to become a tool for 
policy.  Things have developed very differently. DB’s methods have been almost frozen but 
its indexes have been widely publicized by the media, heavily promoted as performance 
scores and often used for motivating policy and defining “best practices”. Exaggerated claims 
have been also made about their consequences for foreign investment and economic 
development.  
This premature success has been damaging. As DB measurements are biased, policy has 
often been misguided and contradictory with DB’s aims. Many reforms in developing 
countries are accelerating formalization procedures that produce unreliable information, 
which is thus disregarded by judges and therefore does not reduce companies’ transaction 
costs. Other reforms have been little more than window-dressing aimed at achieving a higher 
position in the rankings and attract aid funds without substantial or sustainable change. 
Moreover, DB’s apparent success has obscured the need to improve its methodology and set 
more modest, feasible objectives. 
The extensive evaluation of DB by the World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group 
(2008) was considered highly critical by the financial press.1  The report pointed out, among 
other aspects, that the indicators relied on too few sources; that it was hard to estimate to 
                                                 
1 The Wall Street Journal reported on the publication of the evaluation with the headline “World 
Bank Watchdog Panel Rips ‘Doing Business’” (13 June 2008).    3
what extent the numbers were reliable; that there was no transparency about sources and 
changes in the data; and that country rankings merely presumed that less regulation was 
better, without assessing regulation quality. The IEG considered, for instance, that “a risk is 
created by the considerable reliance placed on the decisions of DB staff to accept, overrule, 
or select among informants’ replies, because this makes it difficult to verify or replicate the 
data” (p. 16); and that “the DB team has not indicated the reasons why information supplied 
by informants in prior years is subject to retroactive correction” (p. 17). However, with 
respect to DB’s effects on policy, its conclusions were less critical and even ambiguous. In 
fact, the IEG asserted that it “did not find evidence that the DB indicators have distorted 
policy priorities” (p. xvii); also that “there is little evidence that the DB indicators have 
distorted policy priorities in the countries or in the Bank Group’s programs” (p. 53). 
Consistent with this benevolent judgment, the 2009 issue of DB continued to act as promoter 
and judge of “good” policy.  
This article argues that DB does distort policies in the key “Starting a Business” area. The 
article proceeds as follows. After summarizing the criticisms posed to DB’s methodology in 
Arruñada (2007a),2 Section 3 evaluates DB’s responses to them, and Section 4 argues why 
DB’s methodology is jeopardizing DB’s own objectives in some specific policies, most of 
which, if a different approach were used, could be beneficial. Finally, Section 5 outlines three 
sets of changes that need to be introduced in DB’s aims, governance and methodology.  
                                                 
2 Complementary criticisms are to be found in, among others, Kaufmann (2004), who shows how the 
difficulties involved in starting a business according to the formal constraints measured by DB have a 
low correlation with subjective perception of the same difficulties by entrepreneurs; Ménard and du 
Marais (2006), who argue that DB does not capture the real properties of legal systems and suffers 
ideological bias; Berg and Cazes (2007), who review the policy implications and point out problems 
of selection, coding, weighting and ranking in DB’s “Employing Workers” index; Davis and Kruse 
(2007), who argue for greater transparency and a more plural approach to the theoretical 
underpinnings of DB, and recommend that the indicators should not be used for either policy or 
benchmarking; Svejnar and Commander (2007), who find little relationship between measured 
institutional constraints and firm performance; Drachenfels, Altenburg and Krause (2008), who 
emphasize that DB does not measure the benefits of regulation; and Høyland, Moene and Willumsen 
(2008), who show the weak discriminating powers of DB indicators and also point it out DB’s lack of 
transparency. There have even been calls for closing down DB (Panagariya, 2008).    4
2.  DB failures 
The “Starting a Business” index of the Doing Business project incurs five sets of failures:  
1. Flawed reform priorities. DB’s Starting a Business index considers only the costs 
incurred by entrepreneurs for the initial formalization of a company, disregarding all other 
costs, as well as the value of such formalization services. Consequently, it leads reformers to 
reduce the average time and cost of initial formalization when the priority in many 
developing countries should be to achieve functional business registers. Registers are 
functional when their information is reliable enough for judges to use it to decide in litigation. 
This means that contractual parties can rely on such information for contracting, thus 
reducing their information asymmetry and facilitating impersonal transactions, which are the 
hallmark of developed market economies (North and Thomas, 1973). Register information is 
a public good (see Hayek, 1979, p. 412) but, if left to market forces, may be underprovided in 
terms of both quality and quality. Therefore, in order for a register to produce reliable 
information, it must be independent of the parties and free of corruption; not only the 
relatively mild corruption that leads to speeding up the processing of documents but the much 
more serious practice of faking the date of registration in incorporations and representation 
powers, which makes register certificates useless as proof, or introducing false information 
about identities and addresses, which makes firms invisible to the tax authority and potential 
creditors. Such practices are destructive because they make formalization services useless, 
forcing parties to rely on relational contracting—and, therefore, to miss out on possible trade 
opportunities—and forcing the tax authority to open specialized tax registers, with the 
duplication of costs that this involves. 
2. The DB methodology prejudices essential tradeoffs in institutional design. This is the 
result of several of DB’s simplifications: (1) The exclusive focus on the ex ante cost of 
business formalization, which impedes considering the tradeoff between ex ante and ex post 
costs, including the reduction in future transaction and administrative costs. (2) The exclusive 
focus on mandatory procedures, which precludes the comparison of the costs of mandatory 
and formally voluntary procedures. (3) The exclusive focus on the private costs paid by 
entrepreneurs, which obscures the costs incurred by the State for providing better 
formalization services. (4) Disregard of “private facilitators” (intermediaries between 
entrepreneurs and public formalization agencies), which impedes consideration of the   5
relevant tradeoffs when determining the optimal degree of public and private involvement—
that is, how much of the formalization process should be vertically integrated in the State. In 
particular, it prejudices the choice between public and private solutions, favoring instead 
public, vertically-integrated one-stop shops.  
3. The DB methodology precludes local adaptation. DB’s emphasis on the average cost of 
a specific transaction (the incorporation of a mid-size, limited liability company) favors 
capital- intensive solutions apt to achieve low average costs when reaching economies of 
scale, and impedes adaptation of institutional design to local circumstances—for instance, to 
the predominance of small firms and the abundance of labor in developing economies. 
Similarly, it means institutional design cannot be adapted to the characteristics of the legal 
system (for example, the tradeoff between ex ante and ex post control of legality) and, in 
particular, the judiciary (that is, its capacity to control legality ex post).  
4. Mistakes in evaluation and measurement distort judgment. DB declares as successful 
reforms that are in fact failures or exist only on paper. Arruñada (2007a) judges as failures 
the reforms in Afghanistan, Colombia, El Salvador and Spain that DB claimed to be 
successes. DB indexes also contain serious measurement errors. For instance, DB 
methodology has been mistakenly applied for measuring the Starting a Business index in the 
USA. If correctly applied, it would have brought the USA down in the 2007 DB ranking from 
positions 3-5, alongside Denmark and Iceland, to positions 57-60, alongside El Salvador, 
Lithuania and Sierra Leone (and later to positions 94-98 in Doing Business 2009).3 
5. DB’s marketing promotes misguided reforms and rent-seeking. DB has presented its 
indicators as measures of performance instead of what they really are—imperfect proxies 
reflecting structural differences, many of which may be well-adapted to local circumstances. 
It has also exaggerated the merits of specific reforms as well as the false belief in cheaper 
formalization as a panacea for development. It has defined as “best practices” recipes that pay 
no attention to the costs and benefits left out of the indicators. It has used a sport-league 
                                                 
3 The main reason is that, according to the New York State Department of Taxation and Finance (DB 
takes the main city of each country as reference), you “must apply for your certificate at least 20 days 
before you begin operating your business” (2007, p. 15, emphasis added). Contrary to facts, DB 
reports stated that NYC entrepreneurs had to register for taxes “within 20 days before the company 
starts operating”. Doing Business in 2009 made things even worse by stating that NYC entrepreneurs 
had to register “within 20 days of starting operations” (World Bank, 2008). Doing Business in 2009 
acknowledged that firms must register “at least 20 days prior to starting business” (World Bank, 
2009). It, however, kept computing these 20+ days as one single day.    6
format that encourages emotional reactions and has advocated linking the allocation of aid 
money to the scores.4 All these practices mislead reform in several ways, mainly by 
exaggerating its simplicity and benefits, enshrining a “one size fits all” policy that disregards 
local circumstances, and promoting different forms of rent-seeking, from lobbying DB to 
modify the scores, to introducing “window- dressing” reforms aimed at improving the 
indicators. 
3.  DB’s response 
DB’s initial response to these criticisms (Djankov, 2008) showed once again that its 
narrow focus on certain costs and on rent seeking can damage reform efforts.5  
1. The rent-seeking trap. DB takes opposition to reform by established interest groups as 
evidence that the reforms are going in the right direction. Definitely, many current 
procedures—though not all of them, as the DB logic seems to suggest—mainly help private 
vested interests. However, such emphasis on rent seeking not only distorts reform priorities 
but also makes it hard to manage the rent-seeking aspect of reform.   
On one hand, as made clear in Arruñada (2007a), transactions costs in general, and rent 
seeking in particular, are just the price we pay for having specialized institutions. Reforms 
should aim for efficiency, which means that not only the costs but also the value of the 
services being provided must be considered. And this is especially so for institutions such as 
business registers, whose services act as catalysts in the economy.   
On the other hand, without a proper understanding of the value side of such institutions, 
reformers are lost when managing the rent-seeking side. First, they are simply not prepared 
for dealing with professional interests, which enjoy obvious information advantages. Second, 
                                                 
4 See, e.g., Doing Business 2007, p. 7, n. 3.  
5 Simeon Djankov’s response was accepted and published online by the Journal of Comparative 
Economics, and made available for several months at Science Direct (doi:10.1016/j.jce.2008.01.003). 
Publication in the Journal was withdrawn at the request of Mr. Djankov after the present author’s 
reply had been accepted for publication and was available as an accepted manuscript at Science 
Direct (doi:10.1016/j.jce.2008.04.001). Most of the reply is reproduced in this paper. It is also 
available at http://tinyurl.com/5sjhbd. Interested readers may access and participate in a discussion on 
these matters at http://www.arrunada.org/BlogComments.aspx?Id_Thread=52.   7
public-interested reformers are equally unprepared for managing the rent-seeking practiced 
by the reform industry itself—that is, the new bureaucrats in charge of the reforms, the 
consultants selling goods and services, or the politicians seeking rents from international aid 
agencies. Both factors help to explain why many of these reforms end up in a consensus in 
which old rent-seekers keep most of their rents as the price for letting reformers (including 
the new rent-seekers) show off some apparent results, such as speedier procedures, without 
tackling much more fundamental deficiencies, mainly the unreliability and uselessness of 
business registers in developing countries.  
2. Effect on legal certainty. Focusing reform on minimizing the costs of initial 
formalization and avoiding rent-seeking is therefore too narrow an approach. The value of 
formalization services should also be improved, and misguided reforms can damage this goal. 
DB is also having a negative effect in this dimension:  
First, business formalization is not an end in itself. It is valuable only if business registers 
produce reliable information, so that judges rule on litigated cases on the basis of such 
information and, therefore, private parties can rely on it when writing their contracts. For 
example, if, because of an unreliable register, register certificates are not taken as conclusive 
proofs by courts, the whole formalization system is of little help in reducing transaction costs. 
In such a case, parties have to rely on personal interactions, which drastically limits their 
trade and specialization opportunities. They also have little interest in formalizing their 
businesses because the only consequence of formalization is a bigger tax and regulatory 
burden. Djankov (2008) suggests that the opinion of judges is irrelevant and they should be 
treated only as rent seekers. One wonders how DB-minded reformers can understand the 
effect that these reforms have on legality and transaction costs when the key users of the 
institutions being reformed—judges—are systematically left out of the analysis and 
evaluation.   
Second, Djankov (2008) also suggests that a low rate of refusal of registration is a sign of 
good quality. However, if business formalization is to provide a useful service, mechanisms 
have to be in place to make sure that the filed documents contain the legally required 
information, that they are preserved and, especially, that the date of filing, which is key for 
the legal effects of registration, is not subject to manipulation by parties. All entrepreneurs 
want registers to provide reliable information that all contractual partners can trust. However, 
given the public-good nature of register information, individually they prefer to contribute as 
little as possible—in terms of resources and, most importantly, in terms of information   8
accuracy. Consequently, the optimal rate of registration refusal is not zero,6 yet DB urges 
reforms to aim for such a zero rate.   
3. Unfounded claims of successful reform. DB also exerts a negative impact by repeatedly 
publicizing as successful reforms that are in fact failures. Arruñada (2007a) negatively 
assessed reforms in Afghanistan, Colombia, El Salvador and Spain that DB had previously 
judged as successes. Instead of revisiting these cases, Djankov (2008) offers a new success 
story: the 2008 reform in Bulgaria, which has also followed DB recommendations and has 
also been praised by Doing Business 2009 (pp. 4 and 10-11). However, this Bulgarian reform 
also turns out to be flawed. The new Bulgarian business register has introduced new 
formalities,7 and has been plagued with delays and accusations of corruption (Sofia Echo, 
2007). A month after the new register was inaugurated, in an open letter to the Minister of 
Justice, the Bulgarian Industrial Association (BIA), headed by the same Bojidar Danev that 
Djankov cites as supporting the reforms, described the situation as “complete chaos”, with 
the result that “businesses are being punished” (Beekman, 2008). Consideration has even 
been given to the possibility of closing the new registry (Koinova, 2008).  
Since DB covers 181 countries (as of 2008), it is only reasonable for it to make some 
mistakes. But reform evaluations appear to be conforming to a pattern, erring always in the 
same direction. Policies all around the world are being damaged when badly designed and 
clumsily executed reforms are repeatedly presented as exemplary. 
4. The econometrics: evidence or mirage? Djankov (2008) also asserts repeated DB 
claims that low-cost business formalization provides all sorts of macroeconomic benefits, 
increasing investment, entrepreneurship, employment, productivity, education and gains from 
trade liberalization, as well as reducing informality and corruption. This exaggerates the 
                                                 
6 For instance, the rejection rates in Canada and the UK are 3 and 8%, respectively (World Bank, 
2007, p. 13).  
7 After the reform it is still necessary for Bulgarian entrepreneurs to have the bylaws drafted by a 
lawyer, because the standard forms are too general to be useful; and to have some incorporation 
documents notarized. (Articles 13(3) and 21(4) of the Register Act state that all the documents that 
accompany the registration application should comply with the unmodified laws that regulate them 
and these require notarization). Furthermore, all existing companies have to register again within the 
next three years, creating legal uncertainty for the estimated 30% of companies with duplicated 
names; and have to present a certificate that the company applying for re-registration is an operating 
entity. In addition, the business register has not been entitled to ask parties to rectify minor flaws in 
the documents filed. So, if the business register rejects an entry, the case enters the usually slow 
judicial procedure, while the old system made it easier to correct such minor defects.   9
macroeconomic benefits of reducing the cost of initial formalization, which is just a tiny 
component of total entry costs. Entrepreneurs remain informal mainly because formalizing 
their businesses increases their tax burden without—in many developing countries—reducing 
their transaction costs. In addition, empirical tests using DB indexes are of little help as they 
have severe limitations.   
More effective—not merely low-cost—business formalization should have beneficial 
effects by reducing transaction costs and facilitating taxation and regulation. The efficiency 
of these beneficial effects, however, depends on many factors, including the cost of achieving 
more effective formalization, the extent of the demand for the sort of impersonal trade that 
stands to benefit most from reducing transaction costs and, in the public area, proper use by 
the State of its additional taxation and regulatory powers. The evidence available, however, 
focuses on a few of these aspects and has weaknesses that make it hard to evaluate the policy 
implications.  
First of all, most of this evidence uses DB data that at best measures the private cost of 
mandatory procedures in initial formalization, without considering other costs and benefits or 
the structural characteristics of formalization systems (e.g., the extent and location of 
control). Econometric models relying on such data strive to control for some of these other 
factors. This inevitably makes results inconclusive, as some other variables remain 
uncontrolled. This is the case, for example, of the quality and enforcement of taxation and 
regulation, the cost and effectiveness of other public services, including the courts, and the 
efficacy of civil and criminal liability in punishing wrongdoers.  
It is also difficult for such models to identify causal effects and the influence of hidden 
variables on both formalization cost and the regression outcomes cannot be ruled out. In 
particular, cross-country regressions cannot control for many unobservable country 
characteristics that might drive the results. For instance, economies with good institutions or 
more developed financial markets tend to perform well in all dimensions, making it hard to 
estimate the impact of a particular institutional variable. In these circumstances, the 
significance obtained by the parameter associated with the cost of initial formalization is 
likely to represent something else and therefore provides no guide for policy.  
Cross-industry cross-country studies, which follow Rajan and Zingales’ methodology 
(1998), only resolve some of these problems. For instance, Klapper, Laeven and Rajan (2006) 
use industry-level USA data as a reference for optimal rates of industry entry, but they rely   10
on country incorporation data for measuring industry effects, even though much entry 
regulation is industry-specific. They find that, in countries where incorporating a company is 
more expensive, fewer companies are incorporated, especially in industries for which a high 
incorporation rate is observed in the USA. However, industry-specific entry constraints vary 
significantly across countries (e.g., Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003) and might be related to the 
general costs of business formalization and the potential of entry in each industry. Many 
variables, from politics to administration failure, could thus be causing both costlier 
formalization procedures and tougher entry constraints in all industries or high-entry ones. 
The evidence cannot therefore reveal whether the observed effect is due to the cost of general 
formalization procedures (e.g., company incorporation) or to specific industry constraints 
(e.g., regulations for opening retail outlets). Consequently, it cannot indicate whether reform 
should restructure formalization procedures or relax industry constraints.  
These models also suffer from the possible presence of hidden costs and benefits, and 
difficulties for identifying the direction of causation. For instance, the estimated effects 
remain subject to caveats like “to the extent that … other benefits—such as the provision of 
greater information to the authorities—can be captured even with reduced costs (for example, 
by automating the process)” (Klapper, Laeven and Rajan, 2006, p. 622). This ability to 
capture other benefits with reduced costs seems overly optimistic. Similarly, reliance on 
instrumental variables such as legal origins for identifying causality and correcting a possible 
omitted-variables bias is open to doubt, even for those who pioneered their use. According to 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, “legal origins influence many spheres of lawmaking 
and regulation, which makes it dangerous to use them as instruments” and “we do not 
recommend such [instrumental variables] specifications since legal origins influence a broad 
range of rules and regulations and we cannot guarantee that the relevant ones are not omitted 
in the first stage” (2008, pp. 291 and 293-4). 
5. How important is the cost of initial formalization? In principle, one would expect small 
effects from the costs of initial formalization. However, many of the empirical studies 
estimate that the costs of initial formalization have great economic effects on macroeconomic 
variables, such as levels of formalization or entrepreneurship. This suggests that such costs of 
initial formalization are acting as a proxy for other, more fundamental variables.  
To calibrate the low potential impact that initial formalization cost can exert, two 
common mistakes must be avoided, whereby the cost of registering a company is taken as the 
only factor of formality and as a main barrier to entry.   11
In fact, the cost of initial formalization is a minor part of the total cost of formality. Most 
informal firms remain informal to avoid taxes and regulation, not the initial formalization 
process. For a similar reason, many formal firms remain proprietorships instead of becoming 
corporations.8 Moreover, it is not only the cost of formalization but also its value that 
determine entrepreneurs’ decisions, and both may be positively correlated. When little value 
is added, businesses tend to remain informal, as shown by the high proportion of companies 
that remain unregistered in developing countries. Furthermore, the link between initial 
formalization of companies and overall formality in the economy also breaks down because 
legalization of a firm does not preclude informality in many of its future transactions: e.g., 
most tax evasion in developed economies is carried out by formal firms. In addition, many 
informal firms are small, or comprise self-employed workers. However, the DB index 
measures the costs of formalizing mid-size companies, which are rarely informal. Lastly, the 
costs of formalizing a proprietorship or a company differ substantially because in most 
countries individual firms are not required to register with the commercial register and enjoy 
different tax treatment in terms of both rates and enforcement. Overall, the cost of registering 
a mid-size company can, at best, be a proxy of institutional quality, but not a main cause of 
key macro variables. Therefore, it is not the magic bullet for economic development that DB 
is selling.   
Second, the cost of initial formalization is a relatively minor component of total entry 
costs. The use of the “entry” label for initial formalization costs, which is common in the 
startup literature, causes confusion. For example, the costs of business formalization or start-
up play practically no role in Alesina et al. (2005), who “look at the effects of regulation on 
investment in the transport (airlines, road freight, and railways), communication 
(telecommunications and postal) and utilities (electricity and gas) sectors.” To do so, they 
“measure regulation with different time-varying indicators that capture entry barriers and the 
extent of public ownership, among other things.” These “entry barriers cover legal limitations 
on the number of companies in potentially competitive markets and rules on vertical 
integration of network industries.” (p. 801). However, Djankov interprets that “Alesina et al. 
(2005) find that business start-up reforms have a significant positive impact on investment in 
                                                 
8 For example, the difference between personal and corporate taxes is statistically highly significant 
in determining incorporations in Klapper, Laeven and Rajan (2006), and the economic effect is likely 
to be several times greater than that of formalization costs.   12
the transport, communication, and utilities industries” (emphasis added). Lowering entry 
barriers should be a policy priority—focusing on trivial entry barriers is, at best, a distraction.   
4.  How DB methods jeopardize its goals 
As mentioned in point 2 of Section 2, DB misses essential tradeoffs, mainly the one 
between the greater ex ante costs of more formalization and the greater ex post costs of less 
formalization. This omission  is inconsistent with its objectives.  
For example, DB reports praise Hernando de Soto and consider DB in the same spirit. 
However, the DB methodology implicitly precludes the type of reform inspired by de Soto, 
such as the reform financed by the World Bank in Peru since 1998. This reform initially 
eliminated notarial intervention and introduced a registration (“Torrens”) system: that is, it 
scrapped ex ante private control by notaries in favor of more substantive, ex ante public 
control of legality by the register. However, had the reform followed the DB approach, it 
would have favored a system of deed recording with minimum ex ante public control of 
filings, because in principle such a system offers lower ex ante mandatory costs. The likely 
consequence would have been much greater costs in terms of title searches ex ante and less 
secure property rights. But our aim here is not to weigh the merits of the two systems. The 
point is that DB precludes one of the two, and this precluded system is the one closest to 
DB’s declared objective of providing efficient access to legality.  
This type of inconsistency between DB’s objectives and its effects on policy is observable 
in many other areas. With respect to Starting a Business, DB methodology influences policy 
in such a way that even worthwhile changes in formalization procedures often end up being 
counterproductive and triggering a backlash. Let us examine the seven main changes 
repeatedly described as defining best practice in this area by DB reports:9  
1. Eliminating antiquated formalities. Almost by definition, nobody could oppose this 
policy. The difficulties arise when judging which formalities are really antiquated, and to 
what extent “antiquated” is context-dependent. For example, reliance on paper might be 
                                                 
9 See, for example, Doing Business 2005 and 2008 (World Bank, 2004, pp. 21-23; and 2007, pp. 12-
13). They were also mentioned by Djankov (2008).    13
considered antiquated but online company registration makes more sense in Sweden than in 
countries lacking reliable telecommunications. DB often fails here because, as explained 
above, it in fact promotes a one-size-fits-all view that precludes adaptation to local 
circumstances.  
For instance, duplication of data collection at the tax agency may be costly and antiquated 
but in many countries is a lesser evil because the business register does not provide enough 
control for tax purposes. DB’s disregard of the benefits of ex ante control leads reformers to 
forget that, if unification of data collection is to be sustainable, they must strengthen control 
at the business register. 
2. Standardizing incorporation documents. Making it possible for companies to be 
incorporated following standard forms is in tune with the times because there has been 
substantial standardization of company contracts, both by mandatory regulation and 
voluntary practice. However, in countries with developed corporate law, incorporation forms 
could be omitted altogether by allowing company founders to incorporate on the basis of the 
terms defined by the law. This would avoid any risks  arising from poorly-drafted forms. In 
addition, the need to reproduce the forms in the founding documents could be eliminated, 
thus making collation by the register unnecessary and reducing costs. These may seem simple 
requirements but DB’s lack of attention to quality leads to their being omitted when 
evaluating reforms.  
For instance, DB praised the SLNE (Sociedad Limitada Nueva Empresa) initiative in 
Spain (World Bank, 2004, pp. 17-18) which failed because, among other reasons, it did not 
respect such requirements.  
3. Cutting the minimum capital requirement. Updating the treatment of legal capital is a 
valuable change (Arruñada, in press). However, its main benefits do not come from easing 
barriers to initial formalization (a trivial formality in most countries, given that all companies 
need both a bank account and some capital, and minimum capital requirements are usually 
low,10 at least for the simplest type of company).  
                                                 
10 There are exceptions and they do not only affect developing countries, as those mentioned in 
Doing Business 2008 (World Bank, 2007, p. 12). For example, the 25,000 Euros minimum capital 
requirement in Germany, which has triggered a substantial incorporation of small German limited 
liability companies in the UK. See Becht, Mayer and Wagner (2007).   14
The main benefits come instead from facilitating corporate transactions in the future, 
which at present are often unnecessarily complex and require plenty of lawyering and 
repeated registrations to conform to rules protecting the formal integrity of legal capital, even 
though such rules hardly provide any effective protection. However, for these substantial 
benefits to be achieved, it is not enough for the reform to lower the required minimum paid-in 
capital. Instead, the whole treatment of legal capital by the law needs to be changed, which 
goes beyond DB’s focus on initial costs and short-term results.   
4. Moving registration out of the courts. Reducing the involvement of courts in running 
registers or checking the legality of transactions is often necessary to improve register service 
because many courts lack the required specialization and registers tend to be relegated in 
courts’ priorities. Furthermore, putting some distance between courts and registers allows 
courts to be more independent when ruling cases about disputed registration decisions and 
contested appointments to the position of registrar. However, courts often provide an 
essential ingredient for effective formalization—independence from parties and 
governments—which alternative solutions often find harder to achieve. There is, therefore, a 
tradeoff here which must be managed. It is in the management of this tradeoff that DB’s 
methodology and, in particular, its disregard for any attribute of value, may have a negative 
effect, whatever the alternative solution chosen. In some cases, even the very nature of the 
reform is changed—from simply moving control away from the courts to reducing the degree 
of control—without proper consideration of the consequences.  
Three basic solutions are available: First, when registers are moved to a public agency, 
both service and independence hinge on the incentives of the agency and the qualification of 
registrars. For example, in the case of the recent move of registration from the courts to the 
new business register in Bulgaria, although it is obviously too soon to judge its effects, one 
consequence is that decisions are now being made there by badly-paid and poorly-qualified 
lawyers. This will likely reduce the effectiveness of ex ante control, a consequence that—
whatever its merits—was not intended by Bulgarian reformers, and will likely increase the 
demand on courts for ex post litigation.   
Second, when registers are moved to a private agency, such as a Chamber of Commerce, 
better service can be expected because such institutions are closer to entrepreneurs’ interests. 
However, some worsening of control is likely to arise, especially in public dimensions that 
fall outside the interest of the firms represented by the Chamber. In practice, this solution is 
therefore more viable for registers providing only formalization services aiming at reducing   15
private transaction costs, as was the case of the historical merchant and company registers 
founded and run by trade guilds under the old Law Merchant. This solution comes up against 
difficulties, however, when controlling more public aspects, such as registering for taxes. 
This may endanger initiatives aiming to expand the register into a one-stop shop for all 
formalization services, as happened in the Colombian reform discussed in Arruñada (2007a).  
Finally, whether the register is run by a public or private agency, some decisions can be 
passed on not only to the registrar but also to either the lawyers intervening in the transaction 
or to the parties. In both cases, visible aspects of the service, such as speed, will probably be 
maximized but others, mainly the control of effects on third parties, will suffer. Some 
counter-balancing forces are therefore needed. Italy illustrates how professional monopoly 
can be used for this purpose. The Italian reform of 2000 took control of compliance with 
legality (omologazione) away from the courts, maintaining control by notaries.11 This change 
might have speeded up registration, because notaries are chosen and paid by parties, but at 
the price of further entrenching notaries (by, for example, making it harder to liberalize their 
trade) and allegedly resulting in more lenient control of compliance (Pavone, 2001, p. 183). 
The statutory “declaration of compliance”, usually signed in the UK by solicitors responsible 
for company incorporation (or by founders), can be considered a similar solution, except that 
the counterbalance comes from having the register run by an independent body and providing 
for more effective liability.  
As all these cases illustrate, the tradeoff is therefore more complex than DB assumes. 
More to the point: DB’s focus on ex ante costs means that this complexity is disregarded. 
Instead, it  sometimes promotes naïve policies.  
5. Making the use of notaries optional. Leaving parties to choose whether to rely on 
notaries, lawyers or other firms and professionals for writing and mediating in conveyance 
and corporation contracts, or even to do these tasks by themselves is now probably the best 
policy in most countries. The reason lies in both the development of public titling institutions 
and in market changes, such as the emergence of large firms and the prevalence of standard 
                                                 
11 Contrary to Doing Business 2005’s (World Bank, 2004, p. 22) and Djankov (2008)’s descriptions, 
the register was not moved but continued to be run by Chambers of Commerce. Similarly, the 
company register has not been moved from the courts in Chile and Nicaragua. In Chile, it has always 
been run by a body of civil servants who are still (2008) appointed by the Supreme Court. In 
Nicaragua, it is run directly by the Supreme Court.    16
contracts (Arruñada, 2007b). However, liberalization should also affect the provision of 
formally voluntary legal services, at least in two directions.  
First, in many countries, retaining a lawyer is not mandatory but lawyers are the only 
professionals that can provide legal assistance and, where there is restrictive self-regulation 
of the bar, in practice this self-regulation has similar effects to mandatory notarial 
intervention. This is so, for instance, in the 16 US states in which lawyers are the only 
professionals authorized to provide legal assistance in, for example, conveyance.  
Second, in many countries, impartial lawyering (the key to the function of civil law 
notaries) is mostly precluded by a collusive agreement of the bar that prohibits lawyers from 
acting impartially for the several parties to a transaction. Both restrictions are as damaging 
and outdated as mandatory notarial intervention, as shown by the USA controversy on “non-
authorized practice of law”. The exclusive focus by DB on formally mandatory procedures 
means that the costs imposed by these procedures which, despite being legally voluntary, are 
mandatory de facto are not measured. This leads DB to define its policy recommendations 
too narrowly.  
6. Introducing a one-stop shop for business start-up. DB’s methodology harms policy in 
this area in several ways. Firstly, by considering only the private costs paid directly by 
entrepreneurs, DB tends to disregard the cost of implementing the new systems, which is 
often paid for out of the State budget without any attempt at recovering it via higher prices. 
Secondly, by assuming that entrepreneurs perform all procedures by themselves, DB 
measurements disregard the private agents that mediate between entrepreneurs and the 
formalization bureaucracies—which DB calls “facilitators”. DB’s methodology therefore 
ignores how the market helps solve the formalization problem and just replaces it, adding yet 
more bureaucracy in the form of the one-stop shop.  
This disregard of facilitators precludes the alternative, more adaptable and often more 
reasonable solution of private one-stop shops. The facilitating industry, composed not only of 
lawyers but also accountants, tax agents and administrative specialists, is organized with a 
mixture of franchising, subcontracting and referral structures. This suggests that decentralized 
service providers should be given powerful incentives of the sort that public bureaucracies 
are seldom able to accommodate. It also suggests that the optimum structure for mediating 
between firms and public bureaucracies is probably a variety of more or less specialized   17
intermediaries with different degrees of vertical and horizontal integration, rather than a fully 
integrated formula.  
A sensible policy would therefore be to focus reform on developing open interfaces with 
the bureaucracies in charge of the public core of formalization services while allowing the 
free market to organize a multifaceted intermediate sector, comprising all sorts of 
intermediaries offering entrepreneurs a variety of more or less integrated services. 
Unfortunately, such a solution is hard to imagine when, as in DB, the emphasis lies on public 
one-stop shops, and facilitators are seen only as rent seekers instead of as service providers.  
7. “Allowing” online registration. This is often a worthy reform, but not always. It is not 
merely a matter of allowing online registration. Substantial investment is required that is only 
recoverable with a large number of incorporations.12 Other requisites include reliable 
telecommunications, standardized forms, and, above all, the ability to make the system work, 
none of which are as simple as they may seem. Moreover, DB’s focus on building 
computerized formalization systems disregards costs, as with one-stop shops, but also distorts 
reform priorities: instead of restructuring formalization services, eliminating unnecessary 
formalities and introducing sounder incentives to ensure a functional register, all efforts focus 
on computerization. This is often carried out without any restructuring (as, for example, in 
the SLNE initiative, once praised by DB). In such cases, the inefficiencies of the traditional 
system tend to be repeated in the new system, a common outcome in developed countries. 
Worse still, if the old system was not functional and produced unreliable information that 
neither judges (nor, as a result, future contractual parties) nor public agencies trusted, the new 
system is likely to produce equally unreliable information, following the GIGO dictum of 
computer programmers, of “garbage in, garbage out”. In other cases, ex post control is 
eliminated with computerization, as in Bulgaria where, to the delight of fraudsters, the new 
technology has been affording unconstrained access to company founders’ personal data, 
including IDs and signatures.  
Furthermore, overemphasis on computerization is compounded by the private interests of 
many participants. Donors prefer tangible expenses and, like politicians, tend to favor grand, 
modern technologies. Even established rent-seekers love computers once they realize that 
                                                 
12 For example, the cost of the central processing unit for the SLNE initiative was 11.1 million Euros 
for the period 2003-2006, during which it processed information for 2,001 companies, at an average 
cost of 5,560 Euros per company (Arruñada, in press, section 8.6).    18
their privileges will be maintained by the reformers if they accept them. This entrenching of 
old monopolies in the Internet era can be seen, for example, in the privileged use by 
conveyancers of digital signatures, even though such technology could substitute their 
activities. Some of the newly-introduced systems are in fact little more than a modern form of 
window-dressing, helped by DB’s tendency to consider reforms as complete while they are 
still in their infancy. The recent Bulgarian reform also exemplifies this point.  
In summary, most of these reforms are sensible, but their intrinsic potential merit is not 
the issue under discussion here. Nor am I questioning the design and implementation failures 
often plaguing them. The real issue is that DB has been a contributing factor in such failures.  
5.  What the World Bank could do 
Let me close this article with an optimistic coda. The World Bank has been successful in 
putting the reform of the business environment on the policy agenda. There is still time to 
redirect this success in a productive manner. This, however, requires substantial restructuring 
of DB’s aims, governance and methodology.13  
1. Aims. Measuring institutions is a nascent adventure. Goals should therefore be modest. 
Not only should DB forget about achieving short-term effects on policy—it should strive to 
avoid them until a truer picture of the institutions can be drawn. For this purpose, DB should 
stop marketing its indexes as performance indicators and offer them merely as preliminary 
and partial snapshots of institutional structures. The use of its indexes for allocating aid 
money should also be discouraged. Lastly, considering that institutional change is only 
observable in the long run, it would make sense to produce the indicators less frequently. 
2. Governance. Measuring institutions in countries with different legal traditions requires 
appreciating that different legal structures suit different contexts. This would lead to 
                                                 
13 The Bank has started to be more flexible with respect to DB. In April 2009 it decided to drop DB’s 
“Employing Workers Indicator” and develop a new “Worker Protection Indicator” after concluding 
that the first indicator “does not represent World Bank policy and should not be used as a basis for 
policy advice or in any country programme documents that outline or evaluate the development 
strategy or assistance programme for a recipient country” (Aslam, 2009). In line with the argument in 
this article, a meaningful indicator of the quality of employment regulation should consider not only 
workers’ protection but other aspects, such as, most prominently, unemployment rates.     19
indicators that compare alternative institutional arrangements more fully, intendedly 
considering all their costs and benefits. Questions in institutional reform are mainly 
empirical, not theoretical, but to enlighten such empirical questions without prejudicing the 
answer, the theory of the institution needs to take all the possible solutions into account. DB’s 
narrow emphasis on measuring ex ante private costs is the clearest example of the opposite.  
Broader, multi-disciplinary institutional knowledge is necessary. 
3. Methodology. The changes should affect both what is to be measured and how to 
measure it. Firstly, on what to measure, proxies on the value of formalization must be 
considered as well as proxies on the basic tradeoffs in institutional design—at least, those 
between initial investment and variable costs, between public and private costs, between 
mandatory and voluntary procedures, and between ex ante and ex post costs and benefits. 
Information on these tradeoffs could be compiled either for the components of the tradeoff or 
at least for key variables influencing them, such as the scale of operations.  
Secondly, on how to measure, the user concept should be expanded. Formalization 
institutions are functional and reduce transaction costs only if judges value their outputs. 
DB’s current reliance on business lawyers for most of its information may be expedient and 
suitable for estimating private direct costs, but not for other costs or benefits. De Soto 
famously claims that even dogs know property boundaries (2000, p. 162). They know nothing 
about property rights, however. With due respect, lawyers often have a similarly limited view 
of the contractual and legal process. In this field, they may know the costs of local 
registration but little about the benefits of a functional register. And it is functionality that 
should guide our efforts.     20
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